

## CHAPTER XXI.

AFTER the exercise of the greatest diligence and energy, General Schuyler found himself, at the beginning of August, as little prepared for offensive or defensive operations as at the beginning of July. Every thing appeared to work unfavorably. The country had been parched during a drought, which rendered food for draught cattle so scarce that the transportation of timber for boats and of provisions for the garrison had been much delayed.

“It gave me pain,” he wrote to Governor Trumbull, “to learn that not less than fifty milch cows were on their way here for the use of Colonel Hinman’s regiment. Our working cattle are in a starving condition, the country being parched up by the excessive drought. Such an additional number of cattle would destroy the little feed we have left, and be of very little use to the troops.”\*

Because of the scarcity of provisions, Schuyler ordered General Montgomery, who had arrived at Albany on the 17th of July, to encamp there all the troops that he might receive, until the commissariat at Ticonderoga should be in better condition. A few days later he wrote to General Washington, saying: “Provisions of the bread kind are scarce with me, and therefore I have not dared to order up a thousand men that are at Albany, lest we should starve here.”†

Schuyler endeavored to create some supplies near at

\* MS. Letter Books, July 21, 1775.

† Ibid, July 31, 1775.

hand. The property of Colonel Skene, which the republicans had seized, was put to profitable use. His schooner, as we have observed, had already done good service on the lake. Now his saw-mill was used in preparing lumber, and his small iron works were put in operation under the direction of Samuel Keep, who employed negroes to dig ore near Crown Point, and transport it in scows to Skenesborough. At the same time orders were given that nothing should be done detrimental to the private interests of Colonel Skene. All lawless use of his property had been restrained by General Schuyler; and in a letter to Patrick Langan (who had the supervision of the Colonel's affairs), directing the saw-mill to be put in operation, he expressed a hope that order might be restored, "as" he said, "the view of my constituents is, not to distress any person or injure private property."

August was passing away, and Schuyler was still unsupplied with men and means.

"Not a man from this colony has yet joined me," he wrote to Washington, "except those I returned to you [July 15th], and who were raised and paid by the Committee of Albany; nor have I yet received those necessary supplies which I begged the New York Provincial Congress to send me as long ago as the third of last month, which the Continental Congress had desired them to do. The troops here are destitute of tents, and they are crowded into vile barracks, which, with the natural inattention of the soldiery to cleanliness, has already been productive of disease, and numbers are daily rendered unfit for duty."\*

Jealousies arising out of the clashing authorities of the Continental Congress and the provincial legislatures were now beginning to bear their legitimate fruit, in the form of assumptions by inferiors which were detrimental to harmony and efficiency in the military service.

We have already observed the insubordination of the

\* MS. Letter Books, August 6, 1775.

Connecticut troops, owing chiefly to their idea of perfect equality with their officers, forgetting that in their agreement to follow a leader some of their rights as citizens were surrendered. The private soldier, who felt at liberty to obey or not to obey his captain, also claimed the right to be fed and sheltered by whomsoever he might choose to administer the comfort, and not by another. This feeling of individual independence was shared by most of the Connecticut officers and men as a body ; and when the Continental Congress placed them in service on Lake Champlain, under the general command of a New York officer, they felt shorn of their dignity as citizens of another province, seemingly forgetful that in the great struggle before them the united colonies composed their country, and not the single commonwealth in which they happened to reside. This feeling had manifested itself in many ways, much to the annoyance of General Schuyler, whose views of patriotic sympathy, zeal, and service were broader than the domains of his own province. It at length found expression so offensive that he felt it his duty to rebuke it.

When troops were raised in Connecticut, Elisha Phelps was appointed by the Assembly of that province a general commissary to supply them, and Jedediah Strong, a representative in that assembly from Litchfield, was made a deputy commissary to supply the troops under Colonel Hinman. Strong was engaged in that service when those soldiers were placed under the command of General Schuyler, and Phelps made his residence at Albany, from which place he might more readily forward supplies to the army at Ticonderoga. Both he and Strong appear to have been energetic and faithful men, and had reason to expect promotion if any should be given.

Unfortunately for the harmony and best interests of the

service, Walter Livingston, a nephew of General Schuyler, and quite a young man, was, on the recommendation of his uncle, appointed by the Continental Congress, as we have seen, deputy commissary-general for the Northern department. He was every way competent to perform the duties of that office, and his numerous family connections gave him valuable advantages in the work of his department. But he superseded those already in the service, and aroused a feeling of jealousy on the part of the New England officers and troops which was productive of evil to the common cause.

Mr. Strong, under the direction of Mr. Phelps, had visited General Schuyler at Ticonderoga on business connected with the supply of the Connecticut troops, and was returning to Albany in company with Mr. Livingston, when they met, on Lake George, a gentleman from Philadelphia, bearing from the Congress the latter's commission as deputy commissary-general. The question immediately arose as to the extent of his powers. Livingston properly contended that his commission gave him official superiority to both Phelps and Strong. They denied it. High words ensued. Phelps and Strong contended that Livingston was only a deputy to the former; that it was his business to purchase provisions, etc., and deliver them to Phelps at Albany; and that the Continental Congress did not intend to turn the latter out of office while he behaved himself.

"I told him," wrote Phelps to Schuyler, "that there need be no difficulty between us; that he would have business enough, so should I. However, it did not satisfy the young gentleman, who said if he could not have all the business he would not have any, and added that your Honor had procured him his commission; that he was a nephew of yours, and that he would write to you and let you know that I would not resign. I think I can not answer it to the honorable Continental Congress, or the colony of Connecticut or the Massachusetts Bay [the

latter concurred with Connecticut in the appointment of Mr. Phelps,] if I did, for I think him not a faithful and good soldier who gives up his commission before he is superseded or regularly dismissed.”\*

The three contestants wrote to General Schuyler on the same day. Phelps' letter, in courteous words, submitted the simple facts in the case, and begged General Schuyler to “interpose and direct,” that the business might be so managed by them as not “to interfere with or disoblige the common cause.” Strong, less discreet, wrote an offensive letter. He spoke of his own ill-requited services ; the unfulfilled promises of supplies for the Connecticut troops made by the Provincial Congress of New York ; and of his recent purchases of provisions and live cattle for those troops. He inquired what should be done with his purchases ; referred to the appointment of Livingston by saying : “I find employed some people never recommended to that department by the colony [Connecticut], to purchase our cattle with our own money at an advanced price ;” reminded Schuyler of an alleged promise on his part to recommend Strong to the commissary-general, whomsoever he might be ; and expressed a hope that Commissary Phelps might be retained in office, because he had conducted the business with fidelity and dispatch. After some remarks complimentary of General Schuyler, Strong said :

“Tis, therefore, from your well known acquaintance with human nature, your candor, justice, and generosity, that I entertain the highest expectations and strongest assurance that your influence will be successfully used in removing every jealousy and every cause of it which might tend to alienate the affections of any colony or any part of the army towards so worthy a general and so noble an enterprise. God forbid that any *overgrown colony* or *overbearing man* should at this critical juncture use such pernicious partiality as to *attempt to monopolize every emolument*

\* Autograph letter, July 28, 1775.

and exclude every instrument of public service, for no other accusation or complaint than that he belongs to the most patriotic, free, and generous colony on earth."\*

General Schuyler took fire at the perusal of Strong's letter, and wrote an indignant reply. That letter had impeached his honor, and, by implication, arraigned his integrity. After reminding Strong that it was the duty of all to acquiesce in the determinations of the Continental Congress, and "to obey their orders without entering into the reasons upon which they were founded;" that Mr. Livingston, by virtue of his commission, had the control of all other commissaries in the department, because he was responsible for their conduct; that none but incompetent or useless men would be discharged, and that Captain Phelps would be retained, he informed him that Mr. Livingston would receive the provisions and cattle whenever they should be delivered to him. He then said:

"I should have closed my letter here, but that I think myself under a necessity to put you right in some matters. You say 'When I find employed some people never recommended to that department by the colony, to purchase our cattle with our own money.' Remember, sir, that the appointment was not made by me; that it was made by the Continental Congress, in which the colony of Connecticut is represented. That neither the cattle nor any other stores are to be bought at the expense of the colony of Connecticut; they are to be purchased at the joint expense of the associated colonies, agreeable to the quota fixed or to be fixed by the Continental Congress; and I believe it will be no great hardship, in that case, for the people of Connecticut to have their cattle purchased by whomsoever it may be done, or with any current money whatever.

"I really do not know what you mean by 'monopolizing every emolument.' I do not know who has done it. I have not. If the Continental Congress has done it, I am not the person you should complain to. I am their servant, and not their superior. A copy of your letter I shall transmit to that respectable body.

"I readily, sir, agree with the encomium you have bestowed on the

\* Autograph letter, July 28, 1775.

colony of Connecticut, having ever entertained the highest opinion of their virtue and patriotism, in which I am not singular.

“What you intend by using the epithet ‘overgrown’ is best known to yourself; my construction of it is not very favorable to you.

“I shall always consider it an indispensable part of my duty to try to remove every cause of jealousy in the army which I have the honor to command, and I sincerely wish none may prevail between any colonies, *overgrown* or not. I am not conscious that I have given the least cause for any. If I have, I wish you would complain of me to the Congress. If not, you might have spared the observation.”\*

To Mr. Phelps the General wrote :

“Mr. Livingston’s appointment is made by the Continental Congress, who are my constituents, and whose orders I am implicitly to obey, and so, indeed, is every person that has any concern with the army, in whatever station he may be. You seem to be little acquainted with military distinctions, not to know that a deputy commissary-*general’s* commission supersedes a mere *commissary’s*. Such an appointment is absolutely necessary, that every general who commands an army may have only one person to apply to to furnish him with what may be wanted, and that person must then be accountable.”†

General Schuyler also wrote to the Continental Congress on the same day, and inclosed copies of the letters of Phelps and Strong. He acquainted that body of the refusal of Strong to yield to Livingston, and added : “I should not have troubled you with these letters, but that you may from them see the necessity of some general resolution of the Congress to cure all this jarring.”

Before this letter reached Philadelphia, the Continental Congress had adjourned until the fifth of September, after having appropriated “a sum not exceeding one hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars to be applied toward the discharge of monies advanced and the debts contracted for the public service,” by the convention of New York and the Albany Committee ; and a further sum of one hundred

\* MS. Letter Books, July 31, 1775.

† Ibid.

thousand dollars for the use of the northern army, "in such manner as General Schuyler, by his warrant, shall limit and appoint."\*

The correspondence between Schuyler and the Connecticut commissaries produced much ill-feeling at the time, and was one of the causes of discord and contention, distrust and heart-burning, which prevailed in the Northern army during the remainder of the campaign. The sectional feeling of both the New York and Connecticut troops was strong, and General Schuyler was not the person to allay it by concessions. He was eminently just and generous as a man; as a soldier he was inflexible in his demands for obedience and the respect due to his rank and position. He was naturally quick-tempered, but placable; impatient of disobedience; punctilious in his requirements of attention to every form of etiquette pertaining to the service; never deigning to argue with an inferior, and seldom explaining his motives for a command. In his manner he was dignified, but not haughty; as a disciplinarian he was exacting and uncompromising. He made labor a rule—an absolute necessity—for each soldier reported fit for duty. Work, work, work, whenever needed and in whatever form, was required of the troops; and the idleness that prevailed in the camp previous to his arrival entirely disappeared. The exigencies of the service required such industry, and the health of the soldiers demanded it. Laborers outside of the army were few, and money for wages was scarce. He therefore converted the garrison into a hive of industry, and had every soldier thoroughly drilled for the service before him. This discipline, and labor, and authoritative exactions, so essential to the success of the expedition, were novelties in the experience of the troops. They were en-

\* Journals of Congress, August 1, 1775.



dured as a scourge by those who imagined that a soldier had little else to do while in camp but to keep his weapons clean and practice the military art ; and Schuyler was regarded by many as an imperious taskmaster. But those who knew him intimately, shared his confidence, and appreciated the value of his discipline to the service, loved and honored him as a wise, kind-hearted, noble, and generous man.

While Major Brown was absent on his mission, Schuyler received intelligence from Canada that made him more impatient than ever to move down the lake and take possession of St. John's. He was informed that a force of four or five hundred Canadians were assembled at that place, and were supplied with provisions from Montreal and Quebec ; that two fortifications were in process of erection there, and that one was nearly completed, mounting eight field-pieces and some small mortars ; that thirty or forty heavy guns, with carriages, had been brought up to Chamblée, twelve miles distant ; that the enemy were building large vessels at St. John's, to carry sixteen to eighteen guns each ; that four regiments of regulars were expected at Quebec ; that Colonel John Johnson, and his brother-in-law, Colonel Daniel Claus, were in the neighborhood of Montreal, with about five hundred Tories and Indians ; and that the clergy and seigniors of Canada were endeavoring to stimulate the inhabitants to take up arms against the republicans. He was also informed that the Canadians were generally disposed to be neutral ; that in a recent attempt, by officers sent for the purpose, to compel them to take up arms, in which several who refused were killed, they had assembled to the number of three thousand, disarmed some of the officers, and obliged others to desist ; and that the inhabitants were so well disposed

toward the republicans, that if an army sufficient to protect them should be immediately marched into the province, they would certainly not take up arms for the King, and would probably be active in the liberal cause.\*

But Schuyler's efforts toward adequate preparations for advancing upon St. John's were, as yet, almost unavailing. He had constructed some boats, was building others, and had procured officers to command them; but men, and supplies of every kind, were wanting. He appealed to the Continental Congress for powder, for money, and for hospital stores.\*

"I shall not have quite a ton of powder when the troops are completed to a pound a man," he wrote. "Out of about five hundred men who are here, near one hundred are sick, and I have not any kind of hospital stores. The little wine I had for my own table I have delivered to the regimental surgeon. That being expended, I can no longer bear the distress of the sick, and, impelled by the feelings of humanity, I shall take the liberty immediately to order a physician from Albany (if one can be got there, as I believe there may,) to join us with such stores as are indispensably necessary."†

The Continental Congress had adjourned and gone home, and Schuyler's letters remained unanswered by them for a month. Dr. Franklin, the president of the Philadelphia Committee of Safety, opened them and sent them to President Hancock, but that officer had no delegated power to give orders in the premises, and Schuyler was left to "act," as he said, upon his "own ideas of things in a critical situation." He appealed to the Provincial Congress of New York, but almost in vain. At that moment they could do absolutely nothing. Their inability was called indifference by some, and disaffection by others.

\* MS. Depositions of John Duguid and John Shatforth, taken before General Schuyler, at Ticonderoga, August 2, 1775.

† MS. Letter Books, August 6, 1775.

“By all the appearances of the conduct of the province of New York,” wrote Samuel Mott from Ticonderoga to Governor Trumbull, “they still are unsound at heart. They make a great noise, and send forward a few officers to command, etc., and all the carpenters and artificers who are to have extra pay; but I believe as to soldiers in the service, they are not more than one hundred and fifty strong at all the posts this side of Albany; and it is feared by many discerning men that even their Provincial Congress have scarcely a majority who are sound friends to the cause. \* \* \* The General drives things on as fast as he can, considering what hinderance he has for want of nails, etc., and I believe him to be a very resolute, good officer.”\* “The New Yorkers,” wrote Major Brown to the same gentleman, “have acted a droll part, and are determined to defeat us if in their power. They have failed in men and supplies.”

The omission of New York to raise *men* at that time, ought not to have been a cause for unqualified censure, for it had been mutually stipulated that Connecticut should furnish troops, and New York supplies. But the latter was a difficult task.

“You can’t conceive,” wrote Livingston, president of the New York Congress, to General Schuyler, in a private postscript to a public letter announcing the forwarding of supplies by Peter Curtenius, the contractor; “you can’t conceive the trouble we have with our troops for the want of money. To this hour we have not received a shilling of the public money. Two of our members have been at Philadelphia almost a fortnight waiting for the cash. Our men insist on being paid before they march, not their subsistence only, but also their billeting money. Perhaps no men have been more embarrassed than we.”†

“The corporation arms,” wrote Alexander McDougall, the ardent Son of Liberty, who had been appointed colonel of the first regiment of New York troops, “were so scattered in the hands of the people, that it was with infinite trouble we were able, out of 530, to collect 470, notwithstanding a severe resolution of Congress issued to call them in; and when they were sent to the gunsmith’s, for want of money to discharge their bills they gave the preference to other work.”‡

Major Brown returned to Ticonderoga on the 15th of

\* August 4, 1775, American Archives, iii. 22.

† Autograph letter, August 21, 1775.

‡ Autograph letter, August 9, 1775.

August, and reported that there were seven hundred regular troops in Canada, three hundred of whom were at St. John's; others formed a small garrison at Quebec; and the remainder were at Montreal, Chamblée, and posts at the Cedars and Oswegatchie (now Ogdensburgh), further up the St. Lawrence. He had learned that Sir John Johnson was at Montreal, with a band of almost three hundred Tories and some Indians, trying to persuade the Caughnawagas to take up the hatchet for the King. He confirmed the previous report of fortifications, vessels, and cannon at St. John's, and gave it as his opinion that the Canadians (who believed that the old French laws, which would impose heavy taxes upon them, were about to be revived) were anxious to see a strong army enter their province and relieve them from British rule, but were unwilling to take up arms. He was assured that the Indians would go with the Canadians; and he closed his report by an expression of his belief that the conquest of Canada, if undertaken at at once, might be easily achieved.

Major Brown did not accomplish all that Schuyler had expected, but his information was sufficiently reliable and complete to induce the General to push forward to St. John's even with his small force, inadequately supplied, as soon as he should receive positive orders from Washington to do so. "I am prepared," he wrote to the commander-in-chief, "to move against the enemy, unless your Excellency and Congress should direct otherwise."\*

Troops and supplies were then going forward. The Provincial Congress of New York were using every effort to furnish the quota of one thousand men required of them by the Continental Congress. They had organized four regiments of infantry, under the respective commands of

\* MS. Letter Books, August 6, 1775.

Colonels McDougall, Van Schaick, Clinton, and Holmes ; and some of them were on the point of departure for the North at this time. Captain John Lamb, who had received valuable instructions on engineering and gunnery from Christopher Colles, had been, at his own request, commissioned to raise an artillery company of one hundred men. These were attached to Colonel McDougall's regiment, but on a footing superior to that of the infantry, and were ordered to join General Schuyler as speedily as possible. General Wooster, who had been ordered to Ticonderoga with one thousand troops, had despatched "the whole of Colonel Waterbury's regiment, except the sick," and "Captain Douglas' company."\* Waterbury arrived at Albany at about the time when Schuyler wrote to Montgomery to detain the troops there on account of scarcity of provision at Ticonderoga ; and at his own request, he had advanced as far as Half-Moon Point (now Waterford), to avoid "the small-pox and debauchery" in Albany. His men were employed in repairing the roads between his camp and Forts Edward and George. These now marched toward Ticonderoga.

The New Hampshire Committee of Safety offered to send to Schuyler three companies of sixty men each, "rangers, hunters, and men accustomed to the woods," under Colonel Bedell, whom they recommended as "a person of great experience in war, and well acquainted in Canada."† These had been raised as a guard on the western frontiers of Connecticut. Their services were not needed there, and they had been offered to General Washington. His army was sufficiently strong, and he recommended them to the army of the North. They were accepted gladly, for the

\* Wooster to Schuyler, autograph letter, July 29, 1775.

† Matthew Thornton to Schuyler, autograph letter, August 7, 1775.

tardiness of the Green Mountain Boys in forming their regiment, gave indication that they might not fulfill the bright promises made by Allen and Warner at the beginning.

Governor Trumbull sent Schuyler cheering words of encouragement ; and Silas Deane, one of the most active of the Connecticut delegates in Congress, and who had been among the earliest promoters of the scheme for capturing the lake fortresses and invading Canada, advised him to rely upon the Connecticut people for provisions, for, he said, " I fear you will find New York but a broken reed, and if you should depend too far I fear the consequences. Cattle, and sheep, as well as pork, can best be procured in this colony."\*

Dr. Franklin, who had been touched by Schuyler's appeals to the Continental Congress in the letters he had opened, wrote to him, as president of the Philadelphia Committee of Safety, saying :

" I did myself the honor of writing to you by the return of your express on the 8th instant. Immediately after dispatching him, it occurred to me to endeavor the obtaining from our Committee of Safety a permission to send you what powder remained in our hands, which, though it was thought scarcely safe for ourselves to part with it, they, upon my application, and representing the importance of the service you are engaged in, and the necessity you are under for that article, cheerfully agreed to. Accordingly, I this day dispatch a wagon with twenty-four hundred pounds weight, which actually empties our magazine. I wish it safe to your hands, and to yourself every kind of prosperity.†

The cautious Chase, deputy from Maryland, who had not favored the invasion of Canada, wrote from Annapolis on the same day, saying :

" I am sensible of the many difficulties you have to encounter, and of the anxiety of mind naturally attendant on your very important, and

\* Autograph letter, August 15, 1775.

† Autograph letter, August 10, 1775.

I am afraid, very dangerous command. I sincerely wish you may be enabled to render any effectual service to America. Powder you will receive; provisions, I hope, will be better supplied, and a sufficient body of troops furnished to render the event favorable to your most sanguine expectations.

“I can not but interest myself in your success. The expediency, the prudence of the expedition is left to your judgment. A provident condition, a *sine qua non* of marching into Quebec, is the friendship of the Canadians; without their consent and approbation it is not to be undertaken. So I understand the resolution of the Congress. The generality, the bulk of mankind judge only from the success. I think you, therefore, in a very critical situation, and that an exertion of all your faculties of mind and body are necessary. May I be permitted to wish that a military ardor, a soldier's honor, or a compliance with the temper and inclinations of others, may not prevail over your better judgment. There may be some, from want of discretion, and others from envy, who may be urging you to undertake what your prudence may condemn. I hope I have not said too much, and that my anxiety will be imputed to no other cause than my zeal for America and my regard for you. God grant you success.”\*

Toward the middle of August, Jonathan Trumbull, son of the Connecticut governor, was appointed paymaster-general for the Northern Department, and at about the same time Judge William Duer, residing at Fort Miller, in Charlotte county, received from the New York Provincial Congress the commission of deputy adjutant-general of the New York forces. Sometime before, Schuyler had contemplated nominating Colonel Arnold for that office. Notwithstanding Arnold's infirmities of temper and haughtiness of spirit, Schuyler admired his daring courage, his energetic industry, and his skill and judgment as a military commander; and no one doubted his patriotism. Before Arnold left Crown Point for Cambridge in partial disgrace, Schuyler wrote to Silas Deane on the subject, and upon that hint, which was communicated to Arnold, the indignant Colonel asserted, in support of his character, that the

\* Autograph letter, August 10, 1775.

office of adjutant-general of the Northern department had been offered to him. This report produced some uneasiness in the public mind.

“I am informed,” wrote Mr. Duer, “that Colonel Arnold reports that you have offered him the commission of adjutant-general to the New York forces. If this is the case (though I must confess that I think it is not), his late conduct at Ticonderoga must have been grossly misrepresented to you; for I am very sensible you would not think of showing any mark of favor to any one whose unaccountable pride should lead him to sacrifice the true interests of the country. From this motive, and from the consideration of my being engaged in his controversy with the Boston Committee, I am led to request that you will make an inquiry into the matter; and I am sensible that if you ever had such an intention as he reports, the result of a mature investigation into his conduct will induce you to abandon it. If you never had such a design, I shall be glad to have permission to contradict it, because a public belief of your intentions in his favor is a tacit reproach of my conduct, who exerted myself to the utmost in defeating his designs.”\*

Schuyler saw the impropriety of his nomination at that time, although he had not lost his confidence in the real value of the services of Arnold. He afterward offered to nominate Judge Duer to the same office, who hesitated in agreeing to accept it, because his business connections with his brothers in the island of Dominica might cause them to lose their fortunes on account of his political conduct. He received the appointment, however, but when his commission arrived he went immediately to New York to submit his case to a confidential committee of the Congress. “Be assured,” he wrote to Schuyler, “that nothing less than the critical situation in which I am could prevent me from joining you at this time.”† He felt compelled to refuse the appointment, and Schuyler undertook the invasion of Canada without an adjutant-general.

Mr. Deane, meanwhile, had conferred with Arnold at

\* Autograph letter, July 19, 1775.

† Autograph letter, August 10, 1775.



Cambridge, who yet had hopes, it appears, of receiving that appointment, or some other of equal importance, under Schuyler.

“Colonel Arnold has been hardly treated, in my opinion, by this colony, through some mistake or other,” Deane wrote to Schuyler. “You once wrote to me in his favor for the office of adjutant-general in your department. If the post is not filled I wish you to remember him, as I think he has deserved much and received little, or less than nothing, and it would be a very unhappy state of things if every gentleman concerned in the first adventure that way should be neglected. If you design for Montreal, Colonel Arnold will, I trust, have the command of a body of men capable of making a powerful diversion in your favor; but, at any rate, he ought to be made use of, not to provide for him merely, but to make use of those abilities and activity of which I am sure he is possessed.”\*

\* Autograph letter, August 10, 1775.